Some thoughts on paving the way for Unification

I am not what I termed in my last blog post a 'Naive Engagement' advocate. For whatever reason there are a few of these people in America, Jimmy Carter (who advocated a course of action like this whilst receiving his Honorary Doctorate from Korea University), Sielig Harrison, Bruce Cumings and co. I am sure that Carter is truly one of the nicest Presidents the United States ever had. His ideas were visionary in terms of energy and the sustainability of the American dream (in its present form) and most of the time he was an excellent President (and a great stateman after he was defeated unfairly in 1980). Likewise Harrison has lots of interesting and insightful things to say as does Cumings on South Korea. However... As my ginger haired older cousin (in search of a personal pronoun) Chris says here: http://destinationpyongyang.blogspot.com/2010/12/violence-currency-of-north-korea.html
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North Koreans only respect three South Korean presidents...Who? Park Chung Hee, Chun Doo Hwan and... Lee Myung Bak.

Why? This is where the two issues overlap. It's the tendency of these three to employ the diplomatic equivalent of violence, the determination to give nothing until something is given in return.

I am afraid that the glowing words my guides in Pyongyang had for Kim Dae Jung and Roh Moo Hyun are not a positive sign. I would say this, aid to Pyongyang is probably no longer viable as a way to change the regime. Maybe it was in the wake of the first nuclear crisis in the early 1990s, maybe there was some doubt that allowed American and South Korean policy makers to think they were doing the right thing, but now there appears to be none. It is good to see that the Obama and Lee administrations are not kidding themselves.

The military exercises are also positive shows of force. North Korea's leaders should not receive a non-response. If Lee and Obama were merely to sit around threatening whilst doing absolutely nothing at all this would be a very negative and worrying development. The leaders of North Korea do respond best to organised displays of force, the Axe Murder incident of 1976 is a case in point. The murder of UN soldiers trying to trim a tree resulted in an overwhelming display of force to get the tree trimmed. Of course it would have been nice if the Americans could have marched North, taken Pyongyang and created Hawaii in East Asia but that of course would never have happened (I am sure the Gang of Four might have had something to say about that).

Basically Cheonhan should have been answered with more force. It's just as well that this incident was. North Korea is a high militarised country, I do not believe that the average top-level decision maker believes the stuff that the propaganda apparatus pumps out or in the ideology per se (some do). The point is they do not have to. All they need to believe is that they can attack South Korea, and build Nuclear Weapons producing facilities with impunity as a way to ensure both domestic legitimacy and as a rent seeking device. This is a very negative development. North Korea should not be allowed to get away with actions like this, if they are then hubris is of course the natural outcome for any state, even democracies. So imagine what kind of effect it has on the Oligarcky that is in charge of Pyongyang (although I am sure Kim Jong Il is the strong man, he is surrounded by people who do talk to him about the ins-and-outs).

The signal it sends to Pyongyang is important, but does it mean we should just ignore and freeze the regime out of the international system? The short answer is no. I applaud the Obama attitude to the Nuclear situation, I will explain it. Basically, the North has built a new facility that could very soon pump out Uranium bombs. The facility is more dangerous than existing Plutonium based ones because it is movable, hide-able and rather more efficient. The response has so far been mute and negative. Do as you are obliged to under existing UN resolutions, we are not going to just make some offers of aid. I agree. The best thing to do is work behind North Korea's backs to stop any trade of this material to other states, stop it being used as a device to garner aid, spread proliferation or make money. China and Russia must be aboard for this. The point is North Korea need not get another blank South Korean and American check for bad behaviour.

But just freezing them out might not be such a good idea. Whilst I have already written that the market is a potent adversary in the making for the North Korean state, it remains too disparate because of lines of communication and the divide and rule of state/non-state distinctions. If Kim Jong Il doesn't die in the next two years (some say the follow-up stroke will hit him within the 3 years of his first in 2008) then we may have to deal with North Korea for the next ten years. We need a solution that satisfies both China and Russia as well as South Korea (and America).

Serious talk of unification is important. This talk needs to be directed North by a large information apparatus. Dailynk's Radio Free Chosun is a clear example of what is required in much larger measure; state funding is crucial in this, these Charity operations need a massive expansion in financial support. There also needs to be a concerted effort to flood North Korea with technology and information via the Chinese border. The North Korean state needs to be shown up once and for all to its people. Although this may not spark a revolution immediately, it will begin to convert what is merely cynicism into resistance to the regime on specific issues. We do not need a revolutionary party, all we need is a group across the country motivated by real injustices like rent-seeking by mid-level cadres. If they are fed information from outside they will be able to organise using the existing mobile phone infrastructure in the North and China.

Resistance to small and non-controversial issues is the first small, but crucial step. The fact is that this country has seen no concerted counterbalance to the monolithic power of the Kimist state since the 1960s when a military clique tried to create a few 'heroic' personality cults around a few vain generals. Resistance that does not challenge the state but can mobilise the millions of traders that maintain the livelihood of most of North Koreans is so important. Remember that once the organisation is in place and fighting for small issues it will become more difficult to dislodge or destroy. From here, if the state overreaches it could self-destruct. If not, even if the Kimist regime survives, it may be forced into crucial domestic compromises that could benefit the everyday North Korean, measures like a degree of political relaxation or more reform.

Concurrently, if we can start to spread real promises of post-unification peace and immunity for all except Kim himself (we could even promise to keep the museums to Kim Il Sung if the popularity he has in the North is not overstated) then we could start to make serious headway in the provinces amongst the few remaining supporters of the state line. The fact is this has not even been attempted by South Korea, the only people doing this are small charities in the border areas and South Korea who have highly limited resources. If there was serious money invested in this the results would probably be big.

But the other key component is investment. Basically speaking South Korea and America need to get back in the game. China have been in North Korea for the last 3 years, building up investment channels, opening mines and factories. The South Koreans should start doing the same.

There is a crucial difference between aid and trade. Although they are both expensive for the South Korean tax payer they have rather different effects. Aid is much easier for the North to control than trade is. Basically speaking the Kaesong industrial complex is one big capitalist blackhole, it generates income for the state but everyone who works there understands that the North Korean state is built on a pyramid of lies (like a house of cards).

The Lee regime should make good on the Roh administration agreement with Pyongyang. This agreement envisioned another industrial complex on the West Sea in North Korea. They should for the good reason that it spreads more 'ideological contamination' as the vulgar poets in Pyongyang put it. To me its a simple welfare question, it is better to have North Koreans working than not, people working in Kaesong do so because although they don't get paid well by South Korean standards, they do by North Korean standards. They get to eat, and that is a victory. But it goes much deeper than that. The presence of South Koreans, and their business in the North (if conducted with a common-sense understanding that North Korean labourers must be treated as humans not machines) is very bad for the regime socially and culturally in the medium to long term. Pyongyang will probably tolerate the existence of another zone for the good reason that the money is welcome to sure-up support among its core constituency. However this reflects the short-sightedness of an increasingly geriatric elite.

This is my ideal recipe, increase the power of the markets, and information. Do not make a deal of North Korean terms over the nuclear issue. And also do business with the North. But alas I am not sure whether it is possible to pull such a mixed bag and get a positive response from Pyongyang. The state funding of anti-Northern operations in the South should begin now. The spread of information to the North must be sped up. To deal with the nuclear issue, Washington should seek to put Pyongyang's ambitions in quarantine, there is no point in trying to cut a deal, it will never happen. The best that can be done is to try and stop the spread of what Pyongyang has. The business deal should probably be delayed for long enough that it may pass in South Korea and in Pyongyang. There needs to be a lull. We will have one now hopefully for 3-4 months. Before the North can attack again the South should move to reopen negotiations on business (with no mention of anything else). Perhaps February would be a good time. Hopefully if the North remain quiet until then, this might be possible. If not then it seems that all that is left is the stick.

The Currency Reform: Aims and Results (One Year on)

You know its funny, you follow a country obsessively, so much so that you move to its arch-enemy's Capital to learn the language in order to understand the country well enough that one day you can become a specialist. This is my relationship to North Korea, I listen to North Korean music, I watch North Korean TV (I don't understand 70%), I clap as a greeting in the style of Kim Jong Il (I am not a supporter, his clap however in its pomposity and flamboyancity, as well as its ubiquity at the high occasions of state make it too tempting to impersonate), and last but not least I sing North Korean music.

Yet with all my enthusiasm I am not all together that much better informed than someone living in America or Europe with an interest. That is because although I dedicate a great deal of time (though not as much as close confidants and uncles) the fact is that much of what is said about official state policy outside of the top ruling class itself is speculation, reports from the ground, conducting literary analysis on pornographically vulgar propaganda etc. Thus the true intentions of the state and its policy are usually divided into pragmatic and ideological explanations. It doesn't help that the core defenders of the North Korean ideology have the most to gain materially from its continuance and that concurrently they have also been socialised in an environment that values ideological conformity (presenting a closed world view, like a cult).

Thus we are left with a seemingly intractable circle. North Korean functionaries want to protect their privileges which they get from the North Korean mobster state (this is the interpretation which I have much time for by a name I am sure you know if you read about North Korea). And/or they do what they do because they believe in the core principles of the regime's militant, ethno-nationalist line. So it seems either way that the currency reform itself had the ideological component of strengthing the nationalist state, for the personal and pragmatic gain of the true-believing ideological pure and concurrently rather chubby, enriched functionaries.

Forgive me, am I the only one who sees the cognitive dissonance in this? I would bet that there are some extraordinarily arrogant functionaries who see themselves and their policies as the destiny of the nation; these people exist. Personally when I wake up in the morning and write a blog before memorising a bunch of Korean words I don't see myself as a national saviour, but I do see myself (in a small, but significant way) as a force for good in the world. If I can labour under such illusions, you can imagine how a high-level functionary in the North Korean state or its big brother the army feels.

Which brings us to the currency reform. The policy has been analysed in a number of ways. There are not enough scholars in English who write on the topic for me to say its been 'analysed to death' but it has certainly been well covered. Nonetheless a few contradiction have emerged. There are scholars who see purges in the North Korean state, or just elite-level adjustments as a sign of policy changes, ideological-factionalism (between so called 'reformers' and 'hard-liners'). Yet this analysis doesn't seem to fit the currency reform; those charged with the implementation of this hard-line policy (I will explain why it is later) were allegedly technocrats (Kim Yong-il the former premier springs to mind). Factionalism in the ideological sense has been dismissed by everyone who does not favour a policy of naive engagement. Sielieg Harrison, Han S. Park etc. favour such a policy, so they trumpet such a line that says we must empower the moderates with engagement. Yet so-called 'moderates' are the leaders of such hardline policies. When the policy failed they were replaced by old-style hardliners (Ch'oe Yong-Rim, a close Kim family confidant can hardly be accused of being a moderate economic technocrat can he?).

Thus the policy of currency reform itself is a good argument against the so-called 'soft-engagement' or 'naive-engagement' idea. It seems that Pyongyang's 'modernisers' are even more reactionary than the so-called 'hard-liners', they just launch even more ambitiously far-sweeping reactionary policy projects. Which brings us to the policy itself.

The North Koreans explained it with the normal bellicosity of socialist rhetoric a la Mao. In fact this reminds me of Stalin's first policy moves after he secured power in the late 1920s. Attack the NEPmen; these were the market traders and intermediaries that were making money in the private economy of the Soviet Union which had come into existence as a result of economic liberalisation in the early 1920s. The liberalisation itself was a practical policy on the part of Lenin who having faced down a rebellion from Sailors demanding a little democracy and food decided to let people trade food (thus meaning more was grown, sold and eaten by most people). The North Koreans seemed to have just let the markets go after 2002, allowed official corruption in the market place so that middle and lower bureaucrats could be paid off the fruits of grass-roots capitalism rather than from an ever contracting state treasury.

But this policy was dangerous for the regime in a number of ways. One the state ceased to be the primary source of wealth and comfort even for its supposed 'core' supporters. These bureaucrats could get involved in market trading, rent-seeking etc. their privileged position as an officer of the state was useful in start-up but if they decided to go private they could make even more money (and if collapse came they would be less likely to end up in a South Korean jail than as an official). So the market did (does again) pose a true threat to the regime socially. It is slowly eroding the North Korean state's economic and social raison d'etre.

The market itself as an institutional mechanism (if we ignore its affects on the regime's political support) has been growing and poses more of a threat every year. I was reading an article in Chosun Ilbo yesterday, my Korean isn't good enough to capture everything that was written but I can mention just a few things and then I will explain their significance. North Koreans have been known to enjoy Chinese and South Korean video taped dramas for sometime (this has been known since the early 2000s in fact). But now we see the spread of modern technology not just DVDs (this is also not news) but computers, USBs and even American films and dramas.

This is of course made possible by a stable market mechanism, untouched by a state that lacks the warewithall outside of the shining citadel of Pyongyang (and increasingly even within the capital) to enforce any kind of ideological discipline on what is sold. In this sense the currency reform itself can be seen as a policy to disrupt and shrink the market, not a source of food (I think even top bureaucrats would admit in private to their wives that the food markets could not be replaced by state provision) but as a source of ideas, technology and 'ideological' pollution. The policy seen in this light has been an abject failure to an extent, but the lasting disruption to the mechanism remains to be seen. We do not know what would have happened if the currency reforms had not taken place but I am guessing the markets would be bigger now. Furthermore the fear the reforms have engendered is a good sign for the regime, it has shown that it can still get involved in and disrupt the economic life of the individual in North Korea and must not be ruled out.

Outside of this the policy seems to have served another aim. The growth of the aforementioned private class of traders; this emergent middle class in North Korea who owe nothing to and have little relation to the ruling class or the military minus the paying of bribes was disrupted and partially dispossessed of their ideologically 'ill-gotten gains'. What I mean is that the average market trader (mainly middle aged, hard working, and not in the least bit rich, or fat) lost upwards of 90% of any old-North Korean won denominated savings. This class of indomitable individuals who have no connection to the state were dispossessed in favour of the state treasury itself and those with direct connections to the state (those with senior positions in party, army, or government). As a regime policy it provoked unrest (see DailyNK, Chosun Ilbo, or even just Wikileaks). But this can be handled.

Unrest could not start a revolution because there are no alternative poles in civil society or groups within the country that have lines of communication extending over the country minus the market itself. But the market is itself a disparate group of individuals without political aims (many of these people are just trying to survive), dependent on the state currency anyway. Thus dispossessing them whilst unpopular, and partially apologised for was not such a bad move from the position of head of state (Kim Billionaire as he is called by refugees).

The central problem is this. It was probably launched by cadres who believe in a Socialist-Nationalist state, this is very Nazi sounding and it should sound Nazi-like, essentially minus a minority racial group to persecute this regime is quite similar to Nazi Germany. Both in its ideology, and the increasingly anarchic state of the state itself (if we believe reliable sources). Nonetheless there are probably many who implemented the policy with the full knowledge it was to their advantage (and at the same time with a belief in the state). Thus we have an irrational molasses of contradictions; funny I think that this is all too realistic.

The results of the policy are even less conclusive. The state lost, it could not revive distribution of food, but that was probably never a true aim. But it could not even stop the markets from growing, they have recovered now and they will continue to grow in terms of the quantity, quality and sophistication of goods they provide. There is no civil society in North Korea worth speaking of; yet the market mechanism will probably destroy the regime one day. Its ability to corrupt the most loyal of its followers, its ability to create an alternative locus of group organisation centred on survival and individual effort (as opposed to the state) represent a massive and probably insurmountable threat to the regime in Pyongyang. Although the market didn't bite the regime in the aftermath of the currency reforms it did already show that it cannot be destroyed. If it continues to grow, the disparate aims of its traders may well start to become more unified, and concurrently more anti-state. Although the state is thoroughly enmeshed with the market at a low level it also pursues policies which do not help the market. IE. The continued nuclear stand-off and the fights with South Korea are not good for the market and trading in the North Korean currency. Its funny what the North Korean state does internationally is much worse for its economy than the South Korean economy. So if it continues to pursue such policies, market traders may start to see and realise that the state can and should be disposed of or changed beyond all recognition. If such a consensus were to emerge as it did in Eastern European civil society after 1956/1968 (the suppression of the Prague spring and Hungarian Revolutions) then all that would be required is an external shock like a South Korean air-attack (as one of my professors has said) to bring the state down.

한국어교과서과 문화차이

나의 한국어로 글을 쓰는것은 지금까지 많이 복잡해서 쓰는것이도 번거롭고 읽는것이 짜증나게하거나 귀찮게했을거이다. 또한 다른 과목에대한글을 쓰다가 보니까 옛날에 올라왔던 글은 쓰기로 너무 어렵고 독자도와 나에게 이행동에 가치 별로없다. 그래서 그런 글을 쓰는대신에 한국어교과서를 상용하는것으로 통해 서양문화와 한국문화가 어떻게 다른지 알게된것에대해서 쓸것이다.

한국어교과서에 의하면 한국사람들이 여가활동이 종규 3개 있다. 먼저 한국사람들은 외식 많이 하는편인데 영국에 가거나 데채로 유럽에 가면 식당에서 만드는 음식의 품질과 한국에서 마드는 음식이 차이가 별로없지만 보토사람의서득치고 유럼식다의가격이 비싼편이다. 그래서 그런지 유럽에 있는 사람들이 특히 저녁먹게 외식하는경우는 한국사람에비해 많지않은편이다.

두번째는 한국사람에게 인기가 많은 활동이 술을 마시는것인데 나라의문화에따라서는 술을 많이 마시거나 좀 마시거나 마시면 안되는지 청하지만 대부분은 발전했던 나라들이 술을 많이 마시는편이기는 하지만 영어로 배우기를 위한 교과서를 보면 술문화를 간과하지않으면 그런내용을 별로볼수없다. 그따라서 한국 사람과 한국 당국자는 영국 당국자와는 달리는 술을 마시는것을 부정적으로 생각하지않는것같다.

마지막으로는 교육에대한 어휘와 대화가 나오는게 많은편인데 어느정도 이사실은 한국의 교육에과한열정을 나태내는데 왜 한국 사람들은 이런열정이 있냐는 질문에 관심이 있으니까 설명해볼것이다. 한국사회에는 서양사회첨 이념이 많지만 그중에서 유교란 이념과 샤모니즘이란 이념은 교육의열정과 관련이 많다. 샤모니즘에서는 부자가 되고싶단 생각이 기본인데다가 유교에서는 학자가 제일 존경하는 지위란 생각을 바탕으로 한다. 그외에는 자본주의에따라서 황금만 능주의적인 사고방식을 가지고 있다.

Why North Korea will never sell Nuclear Weapons to Terrorists

A lot has been said in the US amongst academics, the media and in government circles about the risk of North Korea selling Nuclear weapons to terrorists. North Korea is as yet not a threat to the global order, it is barely even a threat to the regional order, and even its capacious, but nonetheless nasty attacks with sadly tragic and unnecessary consequences do not amount to a threat even to the average South Korea, their property or their livelihood. Therefore China remains a mute in public about North Korean provocations and rather unseemly behaviour on the world stage. The likes of Andrei Lankov and Victor Cha, not to mention Brian Myers do a far better job of explaining the ins-and-outs of Chinese policy towards North Korea, so sufficit to say I will offer only the briefest of explanations.

China does not maintain North Korea's existence out of a fraternal sense of loyality and love for its Communist younger brother. The Chinese have made this abundantly clear to both the Americans and to their own people. Its pretty clear that China sees North Korea as a necessary evil. The alternative to North Korean existence is a refugee crisis, possible wars, and of course South Korean-led unification stemming from sudden, state collapse. South Korean-led unification is of course going to happen one day, but neither China nor South Koreans in general are particularly enthusistic about it for differing reasons. The Chinese don't want a pro-American state on their North-eastern border, and the South Koreans don't want to pay the painful costs of unification. But if Wikileaks has told us anything new, it is that China accepts unification's inevitability and is willing to co-operate with both South Korea and the United States. This is a very positive development. If Washington is receptive to the needs of the world's emerging dominant power in East-Asia (I remain sceptical as to whether China will ever become a super power but that's another blog entry) the situation could be very well resolved in the long run.

However even if such cordial soundings were not coming from Beijing there is every reason to believe that the doomsday scenarios dreamt up by the strongest of Hawks in Washington are baseless. I will explain why. But first I will mention some of the things North Korea has done which supposedly add weight to this doomsday scenario. North Korea has sold missiles and Nuclear technology to Iran (with the help of Beijing in the first case, according to the State Department). This of course is not welcome news for the Arab states of the Gulf, or Israel for that matter let alone the United States. Nonetheless this poses no real threat beyond the limiting of a first-strike capability which the United States used to possess over Iran. Contrary to popular-wisdom amongst hawks in general, the Iranian leadership are not suicidal death-cultists who control a state. They are rational, greedy mobsters who seek to silence dissent, in order to fascilitate the continued stealing of their country's oil wealth. They are as much a threat to the wellbeing of the United States as the Saudi Royal family. They just happen to make slightly more offensive noises about history, democracy, and Israel in public. They also sell weapons to our enermies. But they know that if they were to sell more than grenade launchers, I.E. if they were to sell nuclear devices, they would lose their lives and livelihoods. Russia, one of the most anti-American states in the world today would not tolerate such actions let alone the United States. If Iran started selling nuclear weapons to terrorists these weapons could very well get into the hands of Chechen separatists etc. in Russia. The results could be unimaginably horrible. Thus Iran is smart enough to only sell the expertise it has acquired from North Korea to other states. While Iran's president might be a bombastic, election cheating, holocaust denier, he is not so stupid as to destroy what he really wants. The Iranian leadership is very close to Kremlin and is not so stupid as to bite its allies. Concurrently, Russia would not allow a nuclear Iran to attack Israel, as this would threaten world peace. Russia recognises Iran's right to this nuclear deterrent so long as it remains a deterrant and not an aggressive weapon of war.

By the same token, although I am sure Kim Jong Il would welcome the revenue that could be acquired from selling nuclear devices on the open market to wealthy men who seek to fund suicide attacks, such a trade is impossible. North Korea's material survival is founded on aid from and trade with China. China would never allow North Korea to undertake such trades. I would go so far as to say that if China were to suspect that such trade was about to take place it would threaten regime overthrow with South Korean support. China has two very good reasons to prefer South Korean military invasion of the North over the sale of nuclear weapons to terrorists. First, China has its own terrorist problem; Al Qaeda may not be the nightmarish, all knowing, unbiquitous spider that Donald Rumsfeld wanted us to think it was before the Invasion of Iraq in 2003 but put it this way, if they got nuclear technology they might be able to spread it around. The consequences are both dire but not necessarily merely for previously attacked main-land America. China has its own militancy problem in Xinjiang. It is not widely discussed in the west, not so much because its not an issue but because the region itself is difficult to get into and the Chinese authorities don't want to draw attention to it. But they are far better appraised of the problem than I, and I would bet a lot of money that this would be a major reason why the threat of a sale of nuclear technology to terrorists would lead China to almost unbelievable counter-measures.

Second and much more obvious is that China is a resource importing country. It relies on the stability of the global supply lines of trade. If Nuclear technology were to get into the hands of terrorists the results are unpredictable, but I will guarantee you that the effect on global supply lines of natural resources would be devastating. An attack on a Gulf state, mainland America, Continental Europe, China itself etc. would result in a global economic panic. The consequences for China would be socially and politically far more dangerous than Korean unification. The cost of Korean unification would be securing the North-east border from refugee exodus, in addition to humanitarian and developmental aid. There would also have to be reassurances from the United States and an acceptance by the Chinese of America's ally on its border. But the collapse of Chinese growth would not be on the cards.

However, if a real nuclear terrorist attack were to take place in any of the five areas mentioned above the psychological shock to the global economy would be worse than Black Tuesday which precipitated (in part) the Great Depression. In fact I would bet that the attack itself's direct physical impact would be minimal even if it killed upwards of 500,000 people compared to its effect on the quality of life of the rest of mankind. The reasons for this are simple and yet probably not well understood by most. Markets respond to instability and economic fragulity about as well as my hand does to being put in a fire. Basically global trade would collapse overnight. All supply lines would close out of the fear of more attacks. With global trade at a standstill, credit lines, banks and even sovereign credit lines would cease to function. The result would be an international emergency the likes of which we have not experienced since the Black Death in the 14th Century. Law and Order would breakdown. This of course would be a negative development for everyone (even Kim Jong Il). But the Chinese authorities know only too well that their political legitimacy is premised on the continued rapid growth of their economy. Without that the fragile social order would collapse and the strong (but not strong enough) Chinese state would probably collapse with it.

The argument is therefore simple. North Korea selling nuclear weapons to terrorists threatens the existence of China, so therefore it will never happen.

Africa and Democracy

Someone I know and love very much told me that her friend had said to her 'expecting African nations to copy western democracy right now is like giving them a complete set of instruments and expecting an instant symphonic performance'. First I will explain why this is right, second I will explain why we should not be too pragmatic in prescriptions we draw from this.

If we impose a democratic process on a country it does not necessarily have to lead to ethnic cleansing, popular uprising, general lawlessness and anarchy like it did in Iraq. We could see a genuine demoncratic process take route in a developing country. This is of course at a cursory glance, superior to a dictatorship. But in practical terms there are no real differences. Minus the dissidents among a marginal and tiny middle class who will no longer need to be silenced the result is really not worth the effort.

A typical democracy has a large, vocal and significant group of voters who are well informed about the general policies of their government and the alternatives that are on offer. This group is known in English as 'Civil Society', they comprise everything from newspapers, universities and other such lofty, authoritative institutions all the way down to neighbourhood watch, and other local groups that interact with government and shape policy. These groups cannot be manufactured in a vacuum. They usually arise when three crucial ingredients are present: social peace, leisure time and education.

Let me provide a not to subtle analysis on Africa with these three factors in mind. Most of Africa lacks one of these ingredients, with the possible exception of South Africa, Egypt, and Libya. But in the latter two cases they are instead benighted by kleptocratic dictatorships. It must be said though that Egypt does have some potential as a democracy, it does have a very active civil society after all if the Muslim Brotherhood's moderate wing is anything to go by and the kind of writers, intellectuals and professionals who come from Egypt. Unfortunately thanks to the conservative policies of the State Department there is as yet no change toward democracy in sight in Egypt. Maybe in the next 20 years there will be some changes. After all the current President Hosni Mubarek (who has a rather catchy name, although I don't think I spelt it right) doesn't have long for this world. Anyway digress.

Social peace is obviously a ubiquitously missing ingredient is it not? A few examples spring to mind, the election catastrophes in Zimbabwe and Kenya; the continued unrest in Sudan (or as it should be known 'Genocide'); the raging civil war in the Congo, and Somalia; the occupation of West Sahara. I don't claim to be an expert on conflicts on the African continent so forgive my woefully incomplete list of countries. Nonetheless even outside of these we have places with notably fragile social peace, Angola (think of the African Cup of Nations), and Sierra Leon (a civil war not long since past) immediately spring to mind. The continued problems with militancy in the oil producing areas of Nigeria also spring to mind.

The reasons why social peace are crucial to a functioning civil society are simple. Basically you need a peaceful environment in which the state and the citizenry can interact and shape government policy in between elections. At election time of course you need a peaceful environment to allow for reasoned debate, and a free and fair election process. Outside of that, without a socially peaceful environment other hallmarks of a functioning civil society such as moral debate, critical self-reflection on the identity and goals of the body politic etc. become of course near impossible. Dissent from the opinion of those who have the means and desire to use violence would of course be dangerous without social peace, so a fully functioning civil society would be impossible no?

Next is less obvious. Leisure time; it might not be something you think of immediately. I am not the first to say this, I know that George Orwell definitely said this. I am sure many other self-aware intellectuals must have realised that their ability to have such 'intellectually sophisticated' thoughts sprung at least in part from their having such vast pools of time in which to mull over that which should be committed to paper/propagated amongst the masses, and that which best be committed to the flames. Even moving beyond this rather intangible and for the broad mass of people tangential at best example even basic processes of a civil society like reasoned political debate through newspapers, neighbourhood meetings etc. require a lot of time. There needs to be a rich pool of talent that shapes the political agenda, and not only that, there needs to be a populous that has the time away from fighting for survival, ie. food subsistence (not an insignificant issue for many on the African continent) who have the energy to consider complex political equations. Africa has no problem with talent. When Africans have the same chances as Europeans the results can be the same, murderous generals (and brave ones too) and wonderful writers (I'm sure there are some who use too many kitsch clichés too).

Last and I suppose least is education. I say least because really, if you are hungry and there are guns being fired, how to solve a quadratic equation doesn't seem to be the most pressing issue. Nonetheless whilst this is very much the case we should not ignore the fact that if a society is well educated it is usually more likely to develop quicker, and concurrently there will be more people who have a proper understanding about the systems around them that shape their lives. I am not saying that a farmer struggling for survival doesn't know how the state is trying to steal from him and deceive him, I am just saying that a reporter who works for a national newspaper with contacts abroad maybe better able to manipulate the system into being less corrupt. For obvious reasons, a continent struggling to feed its people, with violence as a norm, education has taken a back seat.

If we impose democracy on an African state that does not have these three crucial ingredients, the procedure of democracy may function very well, but the procedure will be empty. It will not yield a transparent western state, subject to judicial review, citizen's activism and to the ultimate threat of the ballot box. Rather, the most likely outcome will be the appearance of a democratic process, marred either by fraud, violence, or just rampant corruption between elections.

Its funny but we as westerners are unwilling and unknowing collaborators in this whole sorry state of affairs. If you have a bank account you are party to investments in companies that do business with highly corrupt, labour exploiting dictatorships that help prolong much of the suffering that is still occurring on the African continent. I know its not something that you (and also I) want to think about, its horrible. This psychopathic disconnection between our actions and their consequences in this 'globalised' world we live in is not a positive development, but it should not be ignored. When the university I am currently attending preaches the virtues of 'globalisation' I think of that and feel disgusted by the kitschness of their empty platitudes.