My Korean teacher is a wonderful, patient and expert woman. I admire her tremendous yet understated zeal for her language; like all good language teachers she knows her language inside-out, she can explain anything in Korean and English. Her English is rather too good, when I try to talk to her in my very basic Korean I usually choke with embarassment because her English shames me. She used to work with foreigners all the time, using just English, so it is understandable that she would be very good at English. You might have guessed from my writing style that I am an impatient, and loud learner, a rather dominant presence in the class room; yet one-to-one my teacher and I still get on well, in spite of the fact that I am not always conducive to group learning.
She is a very knowledgeable person, she knows a great deal more about Korean politics and history than the average person does about their country and its history. From our infrequent one-to-one chats I think she leans leftwards on the Korean political spectrum. This is not saying much, in this age of Neo-Liberal globalisation, to lean to the left anywhere except in western Europe, a couple of ex-communist countries (North Korea, and China), and in some parts of South America is unremarkable. It also usually means little more than an advocacy of a few extra percentage points on general taxation. In domestic and foreign terms this is very much her position, and I find myself, as I become more and more pragmatic with age to be in agreement with her most of the time.
The South Korean left can be broken down into three main parties, which roughly correspond with three factions. There is the Democratic Party (민주당) which is roughly equivalent in most regards to the British Labour Party, or to the Left-wing of the American Democratic Party. This is the dominant, and rather prosaically Liberal part of the South Korean left. The people who are now members of this party ran the country from 1998 to 2008. Both Kim Dae Jung, and Roh Moo Hyun were part of this faction (although because South Korean political parties have a habit of fragmenting and reforming, their respective parties changed names).
The other two notable parties of the Left in South Korea are the Democratic Labour Party (민주노동당) and the New Progressive Party (진보신당). These two parties have remarkably similar Socially Democratic ideological platforms; the key cleavage between them is the former's emphasis on nationalism and the nation. The Democratic Labour Party advocates what is called National Liberation (민족해방), seeking to free South Korean society from the excesses of Capitalism. Whilst the New Progressive Party seeks People's Democracy (민중민주), this slogan connotes a desire to correct the excesses of capitalism embedded in the international economic system. The New Progressive Party is also refreshingly anti-Nationalist. The South Korean left as epitomised by the Democratic Party and its more extreme cousin the Democratic Labour Party is well known for being nationalist. In fact, at times almost xenophobic racial nationalism is one of the fundamental loci of group identity for the South Korean left. The state has always been captive to the 'US imperialists' and their capitalist designs, therefore patriotism is treachery to the left. Rather the race itself is what unites the people, the the downtrodden toiling masses (민중) are united racially by their pure blood line. This is ever so redolent of North Korean nationalism...
My teacher is not a racial nationalist, she has an open mind and a kind heart. She enjoys teaching foreigners, and finds our stories of our homelands interesting, although she prefers it when we tell them in Korean. Yet she on one topic she seems to get her political identity from this nationalism that I just described. The sinking of the Cheonan has spawned lots of paranoid and rather ridiculous conspiracy theories on the South Korean left. Apparently the United States has aided and abetted, a Conservative coverup of the 'real story'. It is all too convenient so the story goes that the Cheonan should be sunk just before an election, and it is to the advantage of the ruling conservative Grand National Party (한나라당). These conspiracies are both baseless, and spring from the nationalism of the left, which is distinctly anti-American. Frankly it was shocking to hear my otherwise sane teacher echoing these conspiracies with a straight face. She told me that she also suspects that the 1987 bombing of Korean Air Flight 858 by North Korea, may not have been what it appears to be.
It is ironic how well the left did in the elections therefore. It is also worth reiterating that this racial nationalism on the Left rose in reaction to the perception on the left of the corruption of the state. Therefore it is at the very root of the Left's Weltanschauung to perceive the state and its investigation as lies. The state is captive to the United States and its flunkeyist (사대주의자) right-wing running dogs.
Saturday, 29 May 2010
Thursday, 13 May 2010
Tan’gun in Korea
The Son of the Lord of heaven Hwanung wanted to go to earth, his father the Lord of Heaven Hwanin gave him permission, so he descended to Mount Paekdu (which is in Modern North Korea/China) with assorted ministers. A Bear and Tiger preyed to Hwanung begging to become human. He told them to eat 20 cloves of garlic and some mugwort then fast for 100 days. The bear was successful (the tiger got hungry after 20 days so he was not). The bear as human was lonely, so Hwanung out of pity married her and they had a son. His name was Tan’gun and he founded the first kingdom on the Korean peninsula, Old Chosŏn and built its first city Asadal.
In the late 19th Century Korean historians and intellectuals began to look to the Myth of Tan’gun as the perfect foundation myth to underline Korean ethnic homogeneity. Tan’gun became the head of the Korean national family tree that extended back 5,000 years. Korea had been an independent people in a variety states for 5,000 years these nationalists claimed. Therefore they should resist the imperialist forces of Japan and the west, and maintain their autonomy and sovereignty at all costs. Tan’gun was a powerful symbol but prominent nationalists like Shin Ch’ae-ho didn’t believe the whole myth. Most of these nationalists were rationalists, who used Tan’gun as a powerful racial symbol, a real but wholly human national progenitor (or as he is known in Korean ‘Grandfather Tan’gun’). Taejong’gyo is the obvious exception. Taejong’gyo is a religion that was started in the early 20th Century. It worships Tan’gun as a god, along with Hwanin and Hwanung. But whilst claiming to have a rich history, it was both new and not popular.
After 1945 Tan’gun gradually became less important in South Korea. Syngman Rhee tried to use the Tan’gun myth as a nationalist rallying point, but this was abandoned by his successors. North Korea went in the opposite direction. Initially the state, heavily influenced by Soviet Marxist-Leninist ideas of history interpreted Tan’gun as a myth that marked the start of a change in Ancient society. Tan’gun was a myth that indicated the start of a new political epoch. The first king of Old Chosŏn used the title Tan’gun and claimed to be descendent of the heavenly Lords in order to legitimise his claims to political authority. This is not as farcical as it may sound; the Japanese emperors still nominally claim to be descended from a Goddess.
But the North has changed their interpretation of Tan’gun. The North gradually moved away from the Soviet model, and started to practice a far more nationalist style of ‘Socialism’ after 1956. Their historical narratives started to change with this ideological and geopolitical shift. Just as North Korea started to assert their autonomy geopolitically, they also began to assert the independent spirit of the Korean people. Initially they did not reinterpret the Tan’gun myth; they just pushed the historic borders of the Old Chosŏn into Manchuria, much to the chagrin of the Chinese.
But by the 1990s when it became clear that ‘Socialism’ had failed as a worldwide movement, they began to go further in their historical narrative. The Koreans were now not only a unique people, racially and culturally; but they had had their own civilisation for 5,000 years. This cuts to the heart of Korean nationalism in general. I will make a clear distinction between primitive, vehement nationalism and patriotic feeling. They are clearly different beasts, whilst states can mobilise the masses under patriotism to do terrible things, patriotism in itself is not malign. To be patriotic is to hold your own state in high esteem, to look to it as you look to your parents. Patriotism can be expressed in many ways, singing the national anthem, saluting the flag etc. Patriotism notice has the state as its focus; from talking to Koreans patriotism is increasingly popular amongst our generation. Nationalism is the counterpart to patriotism. It is in some ways similar, certainly nationalists also use state symbols, the Taeguk for instance is a symbol for both nationalists and patriots. But nationalism does not have the state as its primary focus, rather it is focused on an ethnic identity, it is usually racial. Nationalists identify with an ‘imagined’ racial group as their own; this group is privileged above all others, in terms of its history, culture, language and customs. Korean nationalism is an exemplary example of this, in all respects. The North Korean variant was dramatically strengthened starting from the early 1960s.Originally North Korea had relied mainly on patriotic ‘Socialist’ fervour (loyalty to the revolution and its state). But as the regime distanced itself from the Soviet Union, Kim Il Sung started to use the same ideas that Shin Ch’ae Ho had set out 70 years before. South Korean nationalism is rather crude and unnecessary but North Korean nationalism is both extraordinarily primitive and very necessary as a means of ensuring the survival of the regime.
Part of this nationalist strategy was the use of Tan’gun. In the Northern narrative he was a person, his father was not the son of the Lord of Heaven, and his mother was not a former bear. But nonetheless the shamanistic myth became a real person, they even ‘found’ his tomb near Pyongyang, and proceeded to reconstruct it in 1993. This new narrative was a convenient way to paint Pyongyang as the natural centre of the Korean people, politically, culturally and historically. The North had been doing this since the 1960s. They had begun to ignore the achievements of Southern based kingdoms of Korean history, for instance Shilla, and began to exaggerate the achievements of the Northern kingdoms like Koguryŏ.
It was also part of a survival strategy for a regime that desperately needed add to its nationalist credentials now that socialism had been discredited worldwide, and was soon to fail at home in a catastrophic famine. It is not widely known by most people but the North Korean famine was did not start suddenly as a result of natural disasters in 1995. Rather it was a slow-motion event that actually began in the late 1980s. The North Korean economy had been stagnating and spluttering since the early 1980s. Then Soviets reduced aid in the late 1980s, and then the aid stopped completely with the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. The effects of this were much more immediate than most people realise. North Korea instituted a ‘Let’s Eat 2 Meals a Day’ campaign in 1991, this starkly illustrates the food shortages even at that early stage. The discovery of Tan’gun coincides with the slow-motion catastrophe, and thus can be seen as a part of the nationalist coping strategy of the regime. Just as the first modern Korean nationalists used Tan’gun as a nationalist symbol to unite the people and achieve independence, the North today uses Tan’gun as part of a strategy to maintain the regime’s independence.
In the late 19th Century Korean historians and intellectuals began to look to the Myth of Tan’gun as the perfect foundation myth to underline Korean ethnic homogeneity. Tan’gun became the head of the Korean national family tree that extended back 5,000 years. Korea had been an independent people in a variety states for 5,000 years these nationalists claimed. Therefore they should resist the imperialist forces of Japan and the west, and maintain their autonomy and sovereignty at all costs. Tan’gun was a powerful symbol but prominent nationalists like Shin Ch’ae-ho didn’t believe the whole myth. Most of these nationalists were rationalists, who used Tan’gun as a powerful racial symbol, a real but wholly human national progenitor (or as he is known in Korean ‘Grandfather Tan’gun’). Taejong’gyo is the obvious exception. Taejong’gyo is a religion that was started in the early 20th Century. It worships Tan’gun as a god, along with Hwanin and Hwanung. But whilst claiming to have a rich history, it was both new and not popular.
After 1945 Tan’gun gradually became less important in South Korea. Syngman Rhee tried to use the Tan’gun myth as a nationalist rallying point, but this was abandoned by his successors. North Korea went in the opposite direction. Initially the state, heavily influenced by Soviet Marxist-Leninist ideas of history interpreted Tan’gun as a myth that marked the start of a change in Ancient society. Tan’gun was a myth that indicated the start of a new political epoch. The first king of Old Chosŏn used the title Tan’gun and claimed to be descendent of the heavenly Lords in order to legitimise his claims to political authority. This is not as farcical as it may sound; the Japanese emperors still nominally claim to be descended from a Goddess.
But the North has changed their interpretation of Tan’gun. The North gradually moved away from the Soviet model, and started to practice a far more nationalist style of ‘Socialism’ after 1956. Their historical narratives started to change with this ideological and geopolitical shift. Just as North Korea started to assert their autonomy geopolitically, they also began to assert the independent spirit of the Korean people. Initially they did not reinterpret the Tan’gun myth; they just pushed the historic borders of the Old Chosŏn into Manchuria, much to the chagrin of the Chinese.
But by the 1990s when it became clear that ‘Socialism’ had failed as a worldwide movement, they began to go further in their historical narrative. The Koreans were now not only a unique people, racially and culturally; but they had had their own civilisation for 5,000 years. This cuts to the heart of Korean nationalism in general. I will make a clear distinction between primitive, vehement nationalism and patriotic feeling. They are clearly different beasts, whilst states can mobilise the masses under patriotism to do terrible things, patriotism in itself is not malign. To be patriotic is to hold your own state in high esteem, to look to it as you look to your parents. Patriotism can be expressed in many ways, singing the national anthem, saluting the flag etc. Patriotism notice has the state as its focus; from talking to Koreans patriotism is increasingly popular amongst our generation. Nationalism is the counterpart to patriotism. It is in some ways similar, certainly nationalists also use state symbols, the Taeguk for instance is a symbol for both nationalists and patriots. But nationalism does not have the state as its primary focus, rather it is focused on an ethnic identity, it is usually racial. Nationalists identify with an ‘imagined’ racial group as their own; this group is privileged above all others, in terms of its history, culture, language and customs. Korean nationalism is an exemplary example of this, in all respects. The North Korean variant was dramatically strengthened starting from the early 1960s.Originally North Korea had relied mainly on patriotic ‘Socialist’ fervour (loyalty to the revolution and its state). But as the regime distanced itself from the Soviet Union, Kim Il Sung started to use the same ideas that Shin Ch’ae Ho had set out 70 years before. South Korean nationalism is rather crude and unnecessary but North Korean nationalism is both extraordinarily primitive and very necessary as a means of ensuring the survival of the regime.
Part of this nationalist strategy was the use of Tan’gun. In the Northern narrative he was a person, his father was not the son of the Lord of Heaven, and his mother was not a former bear. But nonetheless the shamanistic myth became a real person, they even ‘found’ his tomb near Pyongyang, and proceeded to reconstruct it in 1993. This new narrative was a convenient way to paint Pyongyang as the natural centre of the Korean people, politically, culturally and historically. The North had been doing this since the 1960s. They had begun to ignore the achievements of Southern based kingdoms of Korean history, for instance Shilla, and began to exaggerate the achievements of the Northern kingdoms like Koguryŏ.
It was also part of a survival strategy for a regime that desperately needed add to its nationalist credentials now that socialism had been discredited worldwide, and was soon to fail at home in a catastrophic famine. It is not widely known by most people but the North Korean famine was did not start suddenly as a result of natural disasters in 1995. Rather it was a slow-motion event that actually began in the late 1980s. The North Korean economy had been stagnating and spluttering since the early 1980s. Then Soviets reduced aid in the late 1980s, and then the aid stopped completely with the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. The effects of this were much more immediate than most people realise. North Korea instituted a ‘Let’s Eat 2 Meals a Day’ campaign in 1991, this starkly illustrates the food shortages even at that early stage. The discovery of Tan’gun coincides with the slow-motion catastrophe, and thus can be seen as a part of the nationalist coping strategy of the regime. Just as the first modern Korean nationalists used Tan’gun as a nationalist symbol to unite the people and achieve independence, the North today uses Tan’gun as part of a strategy to maintain the regime’s independence.
Wednesday, 12 May 2010
Why this is the end of the Liberal Democrats
The Liberal Democrats are the nice party; I have not met anyone in England who has a nasty thing to say about them, most people may be thoroughly ignorant of the Lib Dems core principles and policies, but this is another matter.
Their electoral performance was catastrophic. The Lib Dems were expecting their final breakthrough given the hype, and so-called 'Cleggomania'. Instead as we all know they ended up losing seats rather than gaining the 20+ they were anticipating. Yet here they are the king-makers of British politics who have just decided the make-up of the next British government. Their position as king-maker is however very unenviable. Certainly this was the position the Lib Dems wanted to be in, in 1997. But this is the wrong party to make a coalition with and this is the wrong time, a time of unparalleled post-WW2 economic crisis and social stagnation.
What will be the effect of this coalition? To begin with I must note that for the time being the Liberal Democrats have become a central force in British politics. They hold senior cabinet posts and have genuine influence over future government policy and legislation. This is more power than they have had in 80 years certainly. It is also the position they must have craved since the early 1980s when they seemed have a genuine chance of becoming a third force in UK politics.
But there is a major, soon to emerge electoral problem for the Liberal Democrats. Their electoral strategy, even political raison d'être is being the party of permanent and principled opposition. The party that is free to offer populist policies, and echo national discontent safe in the knowledge that they will never become the party of the establishment and safe in the knowledge that they will never have to face the true political test of holding high office. Now they do. Now they cannot present themselves as the party of alternatives. They have become an establishment party. Yet their electoral base is far too narrow for them to compete with Labour or the Conservatives as a truly national party.So they face all of the problems of being a governing party, I.E. the blame for crisis. But they also face all the funding and electoral problems of a minor party competing with far more established parties.
This leads us to two hypothetical futures. If the economy recovers, and the coalition government remains popular (as it surely is now) then who will get the credit? Undoubtedly the senior partner, the Conservatives. They are also in a better position financially, politically, electorally, and institutionally (think of the right-wing media) to capitalise on this hypothetical success. The Liberal Democrats if the coalition is successful will not be able to capitalise on it. Labour voters will not vote for the Lib Dems in Lib/Lab marginals for the obvious reason that this means supporting a coalition involving the arch-enemy. Naturally conservative voters will not vote for the Lib Dems in Con/Lib marginals when the party they naturally gravitate towards is successful. Thus if the coalition is successful, the best the Lib Dems can hope for is stagnation, the worst is a squeeze where Labour and the Conservatives regains former voters. This is assuming that the desired referendum on Proportional Representation flounders, which it probably will considering how difficult this kind of change is to sell without right-wing media backing and the use of all the organs of state. How can the Lib Dems sell PR to the public on their own? Will Labour join them? It is not clear as yet.
But what if the coalition is a failure? What if the economy still so deeply mired in a corporate and consumer structural debt crisis does not spontaneously bounce back to former glory even with an incredibly weak pound? Who will be blamed? Undoubtedly the coalition. What would this mean for the Lib Dems? The same basic logic of the above paragraph applies. Lab/Lib marginals will swing to the favour of Labour, and Con/Lib margins will likely remain static. In fact ironically it would almost be better for the Lib Dems if the coalition was less successful as at least their would not be a swing to the conservatives in Con/Lib marginals.
At any rate this coalition was to a large extent unavoidable. Labour it seems was not prepared to create a Coalition of the Defeated, and the British public would probably have not worn it. The Conservatives were strategically very smart to seek a deal with the Lib Dems, although it is not especially popular with the Tory grassroots or backbenches it makes a great deal of sense electorally in the future. It is the Clause Four moment for the Tories, it proves that they have moved beyond the Thatcherite legacy. They are now the party of the centre and the party of consensus, when they were the party of right-wing radicalism. A minority Conservative government would certainly have been more popular with the base, and may have been electorally successful in the event of a no-confidence vote. But the coalition makes much more sense in terms of long-term governmental stability, and could very well change the whole British electoral landscape.
Their electoral performance was catastrophic. The Lib Dems were expecting their final breakthrough given the hype, and so-called 'Cleggomania'. Instead as we all know they ended up losing seats rather than gaining the 20+ they were anticipating. Yet here they are the king-makers of British politics who have just decided the make-up of the next British government. Their position as king-maker is however very unenviable. Certainly this was the position the Lib Dems wanted to be in, in 1997. But this is the wrong party to make a coalition with and this is the wrong time, a time of unparalleled post-WW2 economic crisis and social stagnation.
What will be the effect of this coalition? To begin with I must note that for the time being the Liberal Democrats have become a central force in British politics. They hold senior cabinet posts and have genuine influence over future government policy and legislation. This is more power than they have had in 80 years certainly. It is also the position they must have craved since the early 1980s when they seemed have a genuine chance of becoming a third force in UK politics.
But there is a major, soon to emerge electoral problem for the Liberal Democrats. Their electoral strategy, even political raison d'être is being the party of permanent and principled opposition. The party that is free to offer populist policies, and echo national discontent safe in the knowledge that they will never become the party of the establishment and safe in the knowledge that they will never have to face the true political test of holding high office. Now they do. Now they cannot present themselves as the party of alternatives. They have become an establishment party. Yet their electoral base is far too narrow for them to compete with Labour or the Conservatives as a truly national party.So they face all of the problems of being a governing party, I.E. the blame for crisis. But they also face all the funding and electoral problems of a minor party competing with far more established parties.
This leads us to two hypothetical futures. If the economy recovers, and the coalition government remains popular (as it surely is now) then who will get the credit? Undoubtedly the senior partner, the Conservatives. They are also in a better position financially, politically, electorally, and institutionally (think of the right-wing media) to capitalise on this hypothetical success. The Liberal Democrats if the coalition is successful will not be able to capitalise on it. Labour voters will not vote for the Lib Dems in Lib/Lab marginals for the obvious reason that this means supporting a coalition involving the arch-enemy. Naturally conservative voters will not vote for the Lib Dems in Con/Lib marginals when the party they naturally gravitate towards is successful. Thus if the coalition is successful, the best the Lib Dems can hope for is stagnation, the worst is a squeeze where Labour and the Conservatives regains former voters. This is assuming that the desired referendum on Proportional Representation flounders, which it probably will considering how difficult this kind of change is to sell without right-wing media backing and the use of all the organs of state. How can the Lib Dems sell PR to the public on their own? Will Labour join them? It is not clear as yet.
But what if the coalition is a failure? What if the economy still so deeply mired in a corporate and consumer structural debt crisis does not spontaneously bounce back to former glory even with an incredibly weak pound? Who will be blamed? Undoubtedly the coalition. What would this mean for the Lib Dems? The same basic logic of the above paragraph applies. Lab/Lib marginals will swing to the favour of Labour, and Con/Lib margins will likely remain static. In fact ironically it would almost be better for the Lib Dems if the coalition was less successful as at least their would not be a swing to the conservatives in Con/Lib marginals.
At any rate this coalition was to a large extent unavoidable. Labour it seems was not prepared to create a Coalition of the Defeated, and the British public would probably have not worn it. The Conservatives were strategically very smart to seek a deal with the Lib Dems, although it is not especially popular with the Tory grassroots or backbenches it makes a great deal of sense electorally in the future. It is the Clause Four moment for the Tories, it proves that they have moved beyond the Thatcherite legacy. They are now the party of the centre and the party of consensus, when they were the party of right-wing radicalism. A minority Conservative government would certainly have been more popular with the base, and may have been electorally successful in the event of a no-confidence vote. But the coalition makes much more sense in terms of long-term governmental stability, and could very well change the whole British electoral landscape.
Sunday, 2 May 2010
How developed is South Korea?
Before I launch into this argument, I will first acknowledge the methodological assumptions at its heart. Development, modernity, and culture are all assumed as universals in this argument. They are essentialist notions, that are in reality constructions of western culture and western historical circumstances. Specifically as a western paradigm it is rather self congratulatory to say that our industrial revolution, our technological creations, they are development, and pre-existing alternatives are regressive, and antiquated.
South Korea is a developed country. It has one of the largest GDP per capita in the world. Economically it is one of the most advanced economies producing cutting edge technology, as an example broadband in South Korea is far faster than the rest of the developed world with the possible exception of Japan. If you know Samsung, Hyundai, LG, or POSCO then you've seen the Korean economic miracle; South Korea emerged from the the Korean War in 1953 as poor as any state in the world, similar to any sub-Saharan African state in the 1950s. This is understandable, the war itself was tremendously brutal, and destroyed an already extremely underdeveloped post-colonial economy. Yet thanks to excellent economic management of the country under President Park Chung-hee and the influx of foreign capital the country took off.
Concomitantly Korean culture has changed radically since the 1945. There had been Korean nationalists since the 1880s. By this I mean nationalists in the modern sense of the world, appealing to an abstract racial and ethnic identity, an imagined, pure blood line. This is a rather modern idea in world terms and even more so in Korean terms. Certainly Korea culture does have an insular element to it. Korea was well known as the hermit nation, the Confucian Choson dynasty relied on seclusion to maintain itself; and modern Korean nationalism in its racial claims to ethnic homogeneity owes a debt to this. Nonetheless the concept of a Korean race was not a part of the Korean popular identity until after 1945. Korean nationalism is almost more important in the political Korean left today, in its suspicion of American power, the globalisation project and its desire for close cooperation with North Korea. Nonetheless nationalism is still very important to the Korean right, in spite of their pragmatic pro-America foreign policy, and their open door toward western capital the right is firmly committed to the Korean nationalist nativity story. But this wasn't the point of my blog...
Korea whilst being very developed in world terms still suffers from cultural lag in a number of fields. Culturally for obvious reasons the middle-class in the main behave like Russian oligarchs; their conspicuous consumption of consumer goods, and services, the mass proliferation of plastic-surgery is a classic example of this. People in this country are not only not ashamed of their environmental impact, in the main they are positively proud of it. Before I sound patronising or condemnatory I should point out that many western people are equally unconcerned by their environmental impact. But consumption in this country is a direct hallmark of status, to have a specific set of consumer goods marks you as having arrived. To shop in western shops, and to buy western consumer products marks you as a sophisticated middle class person. It is rather comical that to many but by no means all Koreans, Starbucks is considered sophisticated.
Culturally this country is often branded as Confucian. This is a rather general term, it means many things in many different time periods and countries. In this context the term is used to account for among other things the extreme commitment Koreans have to education, which does appear to the outsider as excessive, personally I find it refreshing coming from England. In the context of education, I perceive development itself as being more important, education is associated with the ability to live a middle class or even better a rich lifestyle. In a society that was only 30 years ago still suffering from many of the material problems of a developing country (such as a shortage of electricity and some foods) one can understand why people still prize material security bordering on excess. Excessive scholasticism can be seen in this context as perfectly rational, rather than as being a throwback to a bunch of bearded scholars sitting around ornate palaces in the late 19th Century studying their Confucian classics by candle light.
But in other ways the Confucian label does make a great deal of sense. For instance the persistence of gender inequality. Cultural lag is an extremely pertinent term in this context; whilst an economy can develop from an agrarian backwater to a modern, dynamic consumer society, cultural norms and values usually take longer to change. Whilst I have a great respect for Korean culture, specially the respect for elders, and the strong sense of family, speaking bluntly the status of women is contemptible, and should not be excused according to a relativistic accommodation of cultural differences. To be specific the persistence of the largest gap in pay in the OECD, and the extreme segregation of the Korean workforce with women predominantly occupying informal, part-time and low paying jobs desperately needs to change. Furthermore the ubiquity of prostitution, all my peers know of it, many have visited brothels and are proud of it. Many more men of all ages do so routinely to seal business deals, promotions or foster useful connections at work. There are arguments in favour of prostitution, but in a society where sex trafficking is still widespread, visiting a prostitute is little different to rape or domestic violence in terms of its morality and impact. Yet many thanks to women's culturally inferior status, this developmental vestige or form of cultural lag, excuses what should be considered despicable.
More prosaically, the Korean economy whilst being very advanced remains dominated by Chaebols. Chaebol which literally means Rich family is the name commonly given to Korean mega corporations which I mentioned earlier. These companies along with an activist state were one the key motive forces behind the Korean economic miracle. Yet like in a developing economy they still exercise an inordinate amount of power over civil society, the government and of course the economy. The negative side effects of this are numerous. The Korean media is widely reputed amongst the general public to be in the pay of the rich and therefore not trustworthy when it comes to sensitive political issues like corruption (which it often allegedly does not report) and incidents like the Cheonan (which it allegedly was complicit in aiding government cover-ups). Now most of these conspiracy theories are undoubtedly just that, but the media lacks incentive to critically analyse corporate abuses and pro-business politicians seeing as the media is owned by those corporations. Furthermore, the government itself is widely know to not function according to the law but the rule of personal connections. One can see this in the fact that every Korean president since 1980 has been embroiled in a business related corruption scandal that has affected them or their close relatives. This is improving year-on-year, but corruption remains worse here than most other parts of the developed world and still in many ways is reminiscent of a developing rather than developed state. This is partly born out of the extraordinary economic power of the Chaebols and their oligopolistic control of the Korean economy, civil society and government itself. In the purely economic sphere this is expressed in many different ways. The level of consumer protection is much lower than in Western Europe, therefore phones are far more expensive to use than in Britain in terms of line rental for example. Another example is the frankly unjustifiable banking charges, we have to pay if we withdraw money from our banks after closing time, and if we make a withdrawal from an ATM that is not our bank's own. This is as a result of the Chaebol's economic and political power that mean consumer protection remains much lower than the rest of the developed world.
This is just a small sketch of the ways in which South Korea whilst being a developed society still has developmental vestiges and culturally lags behind Europe. Nonetheless, this country has another feature that much of the developed world now lacks, it has tremendous dynamism, people in this country are so filled with energy and are so constantly busy. It is inspiring to be around, and to be a part of this society as it progresses towards unification....
South Korea is a developed country. It has one of the largest GDP per capita in the world. Economically it is one of the most advanced economies producing cutting edge technology, as an example broadband in South Korea is far faster than the rest of the developed world with the possible exception of Japan. If you know Samsung, Hyundai, LG, or POSCO then you've seen the Korean economic miracle; South Korea emerged from the the Korean War in 1953 as poor as any state in the world, similar to any sub-Saharan African state in the 1950s. This is understandable, the war itself was tremendously brutal, and destroyed an already extremely underdeveloped post-colonial economy. Yet thanks to excellent economic management of the country under President Park Chung-hee and the influx of foreign capital the country took off.
Concomitantly Korean culture has changed radically since the 1945. There had been Korean nationalists since the 1880s. By this I mean nationalists in the modern sense of the world, appealing to an abstract racial and ethnic identity, an imagined, pure blood line. This is a rather modern idea in world terms and even more so in Korean terms. Certainly Korea culture does have an insular element to it. Korea was well known as the hermit nation, the Confucian Choson dynasty relied on seclusion to maintain itself; and modern Korean nationalism in its racial claims to ethnic homogeneity owes a debt to this. Nonetheless the concept of a Korean race was not a part of the Korean popular identity until after 1945. Korean nationalism is almost more important in the political Korean left today, in its suspicion of American power, the globalisation project and its desire for close cooperation with North Korea. Nonetheless nationalism is still very important to the Korean right, in spite of their pragmatic pro-America foreign policy, and their open door toward western capital the right is firmly committed to the Korean nationalist nativity story. But this wasn't the point of my blog...
Korea whilst being very developed in world terms still suffers from cultural lag in a number of fields. Culturally for obvious reasons the middle-class in the main behave like Russian oligarchs; their conspicuous consumption of consumer goods, and services, the mass proliferation of plastic-surgery is a classic example of this. People in this country are not only not ashamed of their environmental impact, in the main they are positively proud of it. Before I sound patronising or condemnatory I should point out that many western people are equally unconcerned by their environmental impact. But consumption in this country is a direct hallmark of status, to have a specific set of consumer goods marks you as having arrived. To shop in western shops, and to buy western consumer products marks you as a sophisticated middle class person. It is rather comical that to many but by no means all Koreans, Starbucks is considered sophisticated.
Culturally this country is often branded as Confucian. This is a rather general term, it means many things in many different time periods and countries. In this context the term is used to account for among other things the extreme commitment Koreans have to education, which does appear to the outsider as excessive, personally I find it refreshing coming from England. In the context of education, I perceive development itself as being more important, education is associated with the ability to live a middle class or even better a rich lifestyle. In a society that was only 30 years ago still suffering from many of the material problems of a developing country (such as a shortage of electricity and some foods) one can understand why people still prize material security bordering on excess. Excessive scholasticism can be seen in this context as perfectly rational, rather than as being a throwback to a bunch of bearded scholars sitting around ornate palaces in the late 19th Century studying their Confucian classics by candle light.
But in other ways the Confucian label does make a great deal of sense. For instance the persistence of gender inequality. Cultural lag is an extremely pertinent term in this context; whilst an economy can develop from an agrarian backwater to a modern, dynamic consumer society, cultural norms and values usually take longer to change. Whilst I have a great respect for Korean culture, specially the respect for elders, and the strong sense of family, speaking bluntly the status of women is contemptible, and should not be excused according to a relativistic accommodation of cultural differences. To be specific the persistence of the largest gap in pay in the OECD, and the extreme segregation of the Korean workforce with women predominantly occupying informal, part-time and low paying jobs desperately needs to change. Furthermore the ubiquity of prostitution, all my peers know of it, many have visited brothels and are proud of it. Many more men of all ages do so routinely to seal business deals, promotions or foster useful connections at work. There are arguments in favour of prostitution, but in a society where sex trafficking is still widespread, visiting a prostitute is little different to rape or domestic violence in terms of its morality and impact. Yet many thanks to women's culturally inferior status, this developmental vestige or form of cultural lag, excuses what should be considered despicable.
More prosaically, the Korean economy whilst being very advanced remains dominated by Chaebols. Chaebol which literally means Rich family is the name commonly given to Korean mega corporations which I mentioned earlier. These companies along with an activist state were one the key motive forces behind the Korean economic miracle. Yet like in a developing economy they still exercise an inordinate amount of power over civil society, the government and of course the economy. The negative side effects of this are numerous. The Korean media is widely reputed amongst the general public to be in the pay of the rich and therefore not trustworthy when it comes to sensitive political issues like corruption (which it often allegedly does not report) and incidents like the Cheonan (which it allegedly was complicit in aiding government cover-ups). Now most of these conspiracy theories are undoubtedly just that, but the media lacks incentive to critically analyse corporate abuses and pro-business politicians seeing as the media is owned by those corporations. Furthermore, the government itself is widely know to not function according to the law but the rule of personal connections. One can see this in the fact that every Korean president since 1980 has been embroiled in a business related corruption scandal that has affected them or their close relatives. This is improving year-on-year, but corruption remains worse here than most other parts of the developed world and still in many ways is reminiscent of a developing rather than developed state. This is partly born out of the extraordinary economic power of the Chaebols and their oligopolistic control of the Korean economy, civil society and government itself. In the purely economic sphere this is expressed in many different ways. The level of consumer protection is much lower than in Western Europe, therefore phones are far more expensive to use than in Britain in terms of line rental for example. Another example is the frankly unjustifiable banking charges, we have to pay if we withdraw money from our banks after closing time, and if we make a withdrawal from an ATM that is not our bank's own. This is as a result of the Chaebol's economic and political power that mean consumer protection remains much lower than the rest of the developed world.
This is just a small sketch of the ways in which South Korea whilst being a developed society still has developmental vestiges and culturally lags behind Europe. Nonetheless, this country has another feature that much of the developed world now lacks, it has tremendous dynamism, people in this country are so filled with energy and are so constantly busy. It is inspiring to be around, and to be a part of this society as it progresses towards unification....
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)
