Some thoughts on paving the way for Unification

I am not what I termed in my last blog post a 'Naive Engagement' advocate. For whatever reason there are a few of these people in America, Jimmy Carter (who advocated a course of action like this whilst receiving his Honorary Doctorate from Korea University), Sielig Harrison, Bruce Cumings and co. I am sure that Carter is truly one of the nicest Presidents the United States ever had. His ideas were visionary in terms of energy and the sustainability of the American dream (in its present form) and most of the time he was an excellent President (and a great stateman after he was defeated unfairly in 1980). Likewise Harrison has lots of interesting and insightful things to say as does Cumings on South Korea. However... As my ginger haired older cousin (in search of a personal pronoun) Chris says here: http://destinationpyongyang.blogspot.com/2010/12/violence-currency-of-north-korea.html
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North Koreans only respect three South Korean presidents...Who? Park Chung Hee, Chun Doo Hwan and... Lee Myung Bak.

Why? This is where the two issues overlap. It's the tendency of these three to employ the diplomatic equivalent of violence, the determination to give nothing until something is given in return.

I am afraid that the glowing words my guides in Pyongyang had for Kim Dae Jung and Roh Moo Hyun are not a positive sign. I would say this, aid to Pyongyang is probably no longer viable as a way to change the regime. Maybe it was in the wake of the first nuclear crisis in the early 1990s, maybe there was some doubt that allowed American and South Korean policy makers to think they were doing the right thing, but now there appears to be none. It is good to see that the Obama and Lee administrations are not kidding themselves.

The military exercises are also positive shows of force. North Korea's leaders should not receive a non-response. If Lee and Obama were merely to sit around threatening whilst doing absolutely nothing at all this would be a very negative and worrying development. The leaders of North Korea do respond best to organised displays of force, the Axe Murder incident of 1976 is a case in point. The murder of UN soldiers trying to trim a tree resulted in an overwhelming display of force to get the tree trimmed. Of course it would have been nice if the Americans could have marched North, taken Pyongyang and created Hawaii in East Asia but that of course would never have happened (I am sure the Gang of Four might have had something to say about that).

Basically Cheonhan should have been answered with more force. It's just as well that this incident was. North Korea is a high militarised country, I do not believe that the average top-level decision maker believes the stuff that the propaganda apparatus pumps out or in the ideology per se (some do). The point is they do not have to. All they need to believe is that they can attack South Korea, and build Nuclear Weapons producing facilities with impunity as a way to ensure both domestic legitimacy and as a rent seeking device. This is a very negative development. North Korea should not be allowed to get away with actions like this, if they are then hubris is of course the natural outcome for any state, even democracies. So imagine what kind of effect it has on the Oligarcky that is in charge of Pyongyang (although I am sure Kim Jong Il is the strong man, he is surrounded by people who do talk to him about the ins-and-outs).

The signal it sends to Pyongyang is important, but does it mean we should just ignore and freeze the regime out of the international system? The short answer is no. I applaud the Obama attitude to the Nuclear situation, I will explain it. Basically, the North has built a new facility that could very soon pump out Uranium bombs. The facility is more dangerous than existing Plutonium based ones because it is movable, hide-able and rather more efficient. The response has so far been mute and negative. Do as you are obliged to under existing UN resolutions, we are not going to just make some offers of aid. I agree. The best thing to do is work behind North Korea's backs to stop any trade of this material to other states, stop it being used as a device to garner aid, spread proliferation or make money. China and Russia must be aboard for this. The point is North Korea need not get another blank South Korean and American check for bad behaviour.

But just freezing them out might not be such a good idea. Whilst I have already written that the market is a potent adversary in the making for the North Korean state, it remains too disparate because of lines of communication and the divide and rule of state/non-state distinctions. If Kim Jong Il doesn't die in the next two years (some say the follow-up stroke will hit him within the 3 years of his first in 2008) then we may have to deal with North Korea for the next ten years. We need a solution that satisfies both China and Russia as well as South Korea (and America).

Serious talk of unification is important. This talk needs to be directed North by a large information apparatus. Dailynk's Radio Free Chosun is a clear example of what is required in much larger measure; state funding is crucial in this, these Charity operations need a massive expansion in financial support. There also needs to be a concerted effort to flood North Korea with technology and information via the Chinese border. The North Korean state needs to be shown up once and for all to its people. Although this may not spark a revolution immediately, it will begin to convert what is merely cynicism into resistance to the regime on specific issues. We do not need a revolutionary party, all we need is a group across the country motivated by real injustices like rent-seeking by mid-level cadres. If they are fed information from outside they will be able to organise using the existing mobile phone infrastructure in the North and China.

Resistance to small and non-controversial issues is the first small, but crucial step. The fact is that this country has seen no concerted counterbalance to the monolithic power of the Kimist state since the 1960s when a military clique tried to create a few 'heroic' personality cults around a few vain generals. Resistance that does not challenge the state but can mobilise the millions of traders that maintain the livelihood of most of North Koreans is so important. Remember that once the organisation is in place and fighting for small issues it will become more difficult to dislodge or destroy. From here, if the state overreaches it could self-destruct. If not, even if the Kimist regime survives, it may be forced into crucial domestic compromises that could benefit the everyday North Korean, measures like a degree of political relaxation or more reform.

Concurrently, if we can start to spread real promises of post-unification peace and immunity for all except Kim himself (we could even promise to keep the museums to Kim Il Sung if the popularity he has in the North is not overstated) then we could start to make serious headway in the provinces amongst the few remaining supporters of the state line. The fact is this has not even been attempted by South Korea, the only people doing this are small charities in the border areas and South Korea who have highly limited resources. If there was serious money invested in this the results would probably be big.

But the other key component is investment. Basically speaking South Korea and America need to get back in the game. China have been in North Korea for the last 3 years, building up investment channels, opening mines and factories. The South Koreans should start doing the same.

There is a crucial difference between aid and trade. Although they are both expensive for the South Korean tax payer they have rather different effects. Aid is much easier for the North to control than trade is. Basically speaking the Kaesong industrial complex is one big capitalist blackhole, it generates income for the state but everyone who works there understands that the North Korean state is built on a pyramid of lies (like a house of cards).

The Lee regime should make good on the Roh administration agreement with Pyongyang. This agreement envisioned another industrial complex on the West Sea in North Korea. They should for the good reason that it spreads more 'ideological contamination' as the vulgar poets in Pyongyang put it. To me its a simple welfare question, it is better to have North Koreans working than not, people working in Kaesong do so because although they don't get paid well by South Korean standards, they do by North Korean standards. They get to eat, and that is a victory. But it goes much deeper than that. The presence of South Koreans, and their business in the North (if conducted with a common-sense understanding that North Korean labourers must be treated as humans not machines) is very bad for the regime socially and culturally in the medium to long term. Pyongyang will probably tolerate the existence of another zone for the good reason that the money is welcome to sure-up support among its core constituency. However this reflects the short-sightedness of an increasingly geriatric elite.

This is my ideal recipe, increase the power of the markets, and information. Do not make a deal of North Korean terms over the nuclear issue. And also do business with the North. But alas I am not sure whether it is possible to pull such a mixed bag and get a positive response from Pyongyang. The state funding of anti-Northern operations in the South should begin now. The spread of information to the North must be sped up. To deal with the nuclear issue, Washington should seek to put Pyongyang's ambitions in quarantine, there is no point in trying to cut a deal, it will never happen. The best that can be done is to try and stop the spread of what Pyongyang has. The business deal should probably be delayed for long enough that it may pass in South Korea and in Pyongyang. There needs to be a lull. We will have one now hopefully for 3-4 months. Before the North can attack again the South should move to reopen negotiations on business (with no mention of anything else). Perhaps February would be a good time. Hopefully if the North remain quiet until then, this might be possible. If not then it seems that all that is left is the stick.